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Abstract
The Big Bang singularity provides little or no evidence for creation in the finite past
and hence for theism. Whether one dismisses singularities or takes them seriously, physics
licenses no first moment of (space-)time. A physical theory might lack a metric or any
other notion of finite length for curves, so a general notion of “beginning” must involve
a first moment. The analogy between the Big Bang singularity and stellar gravitational
collapse suggests that a Creator is required in the first case only if a Destroyer is needed
in the second. The need for and progress in quantum gravity and the underdetermination
of theories by data make it difficult to take singularities seriously.
1 Introduction
The epistemic status of theistic belief continues to be of interest. The modern western
intellectual climate being skeptical about divine revelation and the supernatural in gen-
eral, theists seem to be well served if good theistic arguments from natural philosophy are
available. One of the more attractive theistic “proofs,” given current science, employs the
Big Bang singularity to show that the universe began to exist. This theistic apologetic
strategy proceeds sometimes by explicit use of the formal Kala¯m cosmological argument,
sometimes less formally. Whatever the details, this type of argument has commended
itself to not a few reputable physicists and other scientists and philosophers, as well as
at least one Pope, Pius XII [Pius XII, 1952, McMullin, 1981a]. In the 1960s Engelbert
Schu¨cking announced that “[a]lthough some cosmologists might still unconsciously project
theological pictures into their science, we have been able to scare most of the ministers
out of cosmology by a straightforward application of tensor calculus.” [Schu¨cking, 1967]
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Schu¨cking notwithstanding, significant and visible efforts continue to be made to support
theism via the Big Bang singularity. Evidently some atheists have agreed that Big Bang
cosmology supports theism, and so have doubted Big Bang cosmology:
Perhaps the best argument in favour of the thesis that the Big Bang supports
theism is the obvious unease with which it is greeted by some atheist physicists.
At times this has led to scientific ideas . . . being advanced with a tenacity
which so exceeds their intrinsic worth that one can only suspect the operation
of psychological forces lying very much deeper than the usual academic desire
of a theorist to support his/her theory. [Isham, 1997, p. 378].
While some theists and some atheists hold that the singularity supports theism, mem-
bers of both groups have criticized the argument as well. However, atheistic critics not
infrequently mix with their good points various unhelpful moves such as denying ex ni-
hilo, nihil fit and thus perhaps ceding the rational high ground, introducing premises
that strike the theistic apologist as question-begging, or writing in a tone suggesting that
rejection of the theistic conclusion plays an undue role in motivating the rejection of the
argument. Judging by the lack of progress in some of the literature, the result is a stale-
mate. Quentin Smith, who has played a role in critiquing the singularity argument for
theism, has a different but also negative evaluation of the overall response to the theistic
argument from the Big Bang singularity [Smith, 1992]: “The response of atheists and
agnostics . . . has been comparatively weak, indeed, almost invisible.”
Thus there is room, I take it, for a critique of the argument from the Big Bang
singularity to theism that strives to convince even the Big Bang singularity argument’s
proponents, not just the indifferent and the already opposed. If an argument is bad, there
is value in showing its badness even to its proponents, if possible. Such a critique will
require a brief discussion of the doctrine of creation. It will also involve some concessions
to the Big Bang theistic apologist that might otherwise seem overly generous. Some
arguments will be aimed at persuading the theistic apologist that the Big Bang singularity
is an unpromising strategy.
The critique presented here also has some novel elements, I believe, which should be
of direct interest to nontheists and fence-sitters as well. A reductio ad absurdum strategy
deployed below leads to the conclusion that the Big Bang singularity implies a theistic
Creator only if stellar gravitational collapse to a black hole implies a theistic Destroyer.
The Bach-Weyl theory of gravity shows that a physical theory need not even define the
length of a curve; thus only a topological notion of “beginning” in terms of a first moment
is available if the Kala¯m argument is intended to yield a necessarily nonvacuous necessary
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truth. But a first moment is easy to avoid, as will appear below.
It should be emphasized that the point at issue is not primarily the soundness of the
Kala¯m cosmological argument, but rather its dialectical effectiveness. A theist might
think that the Kala¯m argument is sound and accept the critique made here, by holding
that the key controversial premise of the Kala¯m argument ought to be accepted not on
the grounds of Big Bang cosmology, but only on the basis of divine revelation. The
medieval debate about Aristotle’s doctrine of the eternity of the world provides a very
helpful precedent.
2 The Doctrine of Creation and Its Warrant
Historically, the doctrine of creation has been basically common property among Judaism,
Christianity and Islam. While there have been some differing views about the doctrine,
the differences have little to do with the differences between these Abrahamic religions.
A consensus arose that, pace Plato’s Timaeus, creation was ex nihilo: God brought (or
timelessly brings) all other things into existence and does so without using pre-existing
materials. Furthermore, God creates the world voluntarily, as a result of willing rather
than as an unwilled necessary emanation. Besides the initial creation ex nihilo “in the
beginning,” there is some sort of ongoing sustenance, preservation, continuing creation
or the like, by which God keeps the world in existence and without which it would cease
to exist [Quinn, 1993].
Given creation ex nihilo, a secondary question is whether God created the world
in the finite past or eternally. We may speak of “creation in time” if the universe is
finitely old and had a first moment of existence. (If the universe is finitely old but had
no first moment, then it is unclear whether creation in time or eternal creation is a
more appropriate term, especially on account of conventionality worries to be discussed
below.) At times some have denied the initial creation in favor of God’s eternally creating
the universe. In medieval times this denial occurred with Islamic philosophers such as
Avicenna and Averroes and with the very Aristotelian Averroists in western Christendom.
This “eternal creation” view was defeated by orthodoxy defending creation in time, such
as the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 and the condemnations by Bishop Tempier of Paris
in 1277.
Advocates of creation in time have disagreed whether the finite age of the universe
could be known by reason or only by faith [Thijssen, 1998]. In response to Aristotelian
philosophical arguments for an eternal universe, Moses Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas
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both held such arguments to be inconclusive. Both also held the philosophical arguments
of their days in favor of a finite age to be inconclusive. Thus the issue was left to be
resolved by Scripture, which favored finite age [Hyman and Walsh, 1973]. Bonaventure,
by contrast, took the finite age of the universe to be demonstrable philosophically. This
distinction is closely analogous to the issue addressed in this paper. Those who argue
for theism from the Big Bang singularity follow Bonaventure in spirit. I will argue that
theists who affirm creation in time ought to hold, with Maimonides and Aquinas in spirit,
that creation in time is known by faith rather than by natural philosophy—or at least,
not from the singularity in Big Bang cosmology.
I will comment briefly on William Lane Craig and Paul Copan’s a priori arguments
for a finite past. Regarding the supposed impossibility of a traversing an actual infin-
ity [Craig, 1979, Copan and Craig, 2004], one might object to the treatment of infinity
[Morriston, 2003]. Regarding the possibility of the existence of an actual infinity, I cannot
find anything absurd in Hilbert’s hotel, which has as many rooms as there are positive
integers. It appears that Craig’s objections are due in no small part to the widespread
claim that the concept of size is fully captured by the notion of cardinality. But one might
well accept the possibility of actual infinities, such as Hilbert’s hotel, while denying that
cardinality exhausts the notion of sameness of size. It is also difficult to regard as om-
nipotent a God who could not create Hilbert’s hotel. These comments are incidental to
the thrust of this paper, however. If creation in time could be known a priori, then ar-
guments from physical cosmology would be largely redundant. For the sake of argument
I therefore assume that a finite past is metaphysically possible.
In modern theology, the initial creation was downplayed Friedrich Schleiermacher
as not necessitated by his controlling principle of the feeling of absolute dependence
[Russell, 1996b]. Moreover, he took the doctrine of the initial creation event to depend
on the Genesis creation account, which he took to be the product of a mythological time
[Copan and Craig, 2004, pp. 150, 151]. Quite a few modern scholars have felt free to
discard or hold lightly the initial creation event, so eternal creation is now regarded as
attractive in some circles [Russell, 1996a]. According to John Polkinghorne, “[t]heology
is concerned with ontological origin and not with temporal beginning. The idea of cre-
ation has no special stake in a datable start to the universe.” [Polkinghorne, 1994] Paul
Helm has agreed [Helm, 1997]. The question has also arisen whether Genesis 1:1 actually
asserts a beginning or not, but the traditional interpretation still certainly has defenders
[Copan and Craig, 2004]. It should go without saying that the interpretation of a text is
a distinct issue from the correctness of its assertions.
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If a universe is created, is it eternal, finitely old but lacking a first moment, or finitely
old with a first moment? The universe’s having a first moment entails its being finitely old
(unless one introduces a point at infinity, which seems purely formal), but the converse
entailment might fail. If time is continuous, then the world’s being finitely old does not
entail its having a first moment. At least prima facie it seems that a universe with a
first moment is the sort most confirmatory of theism [McMullin, 1981b], while an eternal
universe is the least helpful. If so, then eternal creation might not be the best view for
religious theists. Regarding the two extreme cases, Aquinas held something along these
lines, as Ernan McMullin discusses:
If the universe began at a point of time, would this give stronger support
to the claim that a Creator is needed than if the universe always existed?
Aquinas argued that in a sense it would, even though he was insistent that
a universe which had always existed would equally need a Creator to sustain
it. But creation in time rather than from eternity makes the work of God’s
power more evident, Aquinas says, because an agent displays the more power
in acting, the more removed from act is the potency acted upon. And in
creation in time there is no potency of any kind to work on. This of itself
immediately shows the infinity of power required to summon a universe into
act. [McMullin, 1981a, p. 39]
A first moment appears to convey three advantages on the doctrine of creation over
mere finite age. First, it is more obvious that a finitely old universe with a first mo-
ment requires an external Cause than that a finitely old universe in which every mo-
ment is preceded by an earlier one does. In the latter case, one might be tempted
to think that the present is fully explained by the past within the history of the uni-
verse, so nothing external is required [Gru¨nbaum, 1989]. Second, having a first mo-
ment is a topological notion, not a metrical one, and so escapes conventionality wor-
ries [Levy-Leblond, 1990, Misner, 1969, Agnese and Wataghin, 1971, McMullin, 1981a,
Gru¨nbaum, 1989] about temporal remetrization of a finite past to an infinite one and
the conventionality of the metric [Gru¨nbaum, 1973]. Conventionalist questions about
the significance of the difference finite vs. infinite seem to be due to E. A. Milne
[Kragh, 2004, p. 209][McMullin, 1981a]. Metrical conventionality becomes an espe-
cially serious worry in physical theories containing multiple metrics. Scalar-tensor the-
ories are perhaps the best known locus for the question “Which metric is the physi-
cal metric?” [Weinstein, 1996, Magnano and Sokolowski, 1994, Kaloper and Olive, 1998,
Santiago and Silbergleit, 2000]. While this question seems not to need an answer for most
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purposes (such as those involving only the field equations), questions of singularities,
boundary conditions, positive energy and quantization give that question a bit more ur-
gency [Kaloper and Olive, 1998, Santiago and Silbergleit, 2000, Faraoni and Nadeau, 2007,
Sotiriou et al., 2007, Catena et al., 2006]. Theories with multiple metrics might have dif-
ferent types of matter coupling to gravity in different ways; then perhaps one metric
might yield finite age, but another infinite age, in which case there seems to be no
answer to the question “how old is the universe?”, even if the options at hand are
merely “finite” and “infinite.” It turns out that the actual universe probably does
not behave in accord with a scalar-tensor theory, given the empirical confirmation of
the various principles of equivalence in gravity [Will, 1993], which make it difficult for
theories empirically distinguishable from GTR in weak or moderate gravitational fields
to be empirically viable. But a doctrine of creation needs to be modally rich enough
to accommodate the possibility of God’s creating worlds with physical laws without a
unique or preferred metrical structure to license an answer of “finite” or of “infinite.”
Third, a first moment, being topological rather than metrical, is well defined even in
the absence of a metric. Bach-Weyl conformal gravity [Fiedler and Schimming, 1980,
Schimming and Schmidt, 1990, Kazanas and Mannheim, 1991, Dzhunushaliev and Schmidt, 2000],
in the absence of matter or with some types of matter, employs only the conformal part
gˆµν of a metric, a tensor density with determinant −1. Given a metric gµν , one can
obtain its conformal part using gˆµν = gµν(−detgαβ)
−
1
4 in four space-time dimensions.
Not having a metric, the Bach-Weyl theory takes gˆµν as primitive and does not assign
lengths to curves.1 While light-like (null) geodesics are well defined in the Bach-Weyl
theory, their affine parametrization is not [Wald, 1984, p. 446], so even light-like (null)
geodesics provide no help in defining finite age. By contrast Copan and Craig simply take
for granted the existence, and perhaps the uniqueness, of the metric for timelike curves
in setting up the Kala¯m argument [Copan and Craig, 2004, p. 199] (here presented a bit
differently from the version quoted below):
1The Lagrangian density of the Bach-Weyl tensor is the square of the Weyl curvature tensor C µρσν . The
Weyl tensor in its natural habitat is a (1, 3) tensor and is a concomitant of the conformal metric density
without the determinant g =def det(gαβ) [Anderson, 1967], so it is itself conformally invariant [Wald, 1984].
Thus the Lagrangian density is (up to a constant factor) gˆρα gˆσβC µρσν C
ν
αβµ . The absence of g has been made
manifest by the use of the inverse conformal metric tensor density gˆµν , which has density weight 1
2
, and the
primordial (1, 3) form of the Weyl tensor. Much like the Maxwell electromagnetic kinetic term gˆµαgˆνβFµνFαβ,
this Bach Lagrangian density is a weight 1 scalar density, as is required for a coordinate-invariant stationary
action principle, without g and so is manifestly conformally invariant.
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To assess the truth of the premise [that the temporal series of past, physical
events is not beginningless], it will be helpful to define some terms.. . . In order
that all the events comprising the temporal series of past events be of equal
duration, we arbitrarily stipulate some event as our standard.. . . By a “begin-
ning,” one means a first standard event. It is therefore not relevant whether
the temporal series had a beginning point (a first temporal instant).
Copan and Craig presumably take their Kala¯m argument to express a necessary truth that
applies nonvacuously to all possible physical theories, but their criterion for a beginning is
meaningless for the Bach-Weyl theory. It might be ambiguous for scalar tensor theories,
which is also somewhat worrisome. Given that neither existence nor uniqueness of a
metric (for timelike curves) holds necessarily, the natural move is to adopt a topological
rather than metrical notion of beginning. Thus a first moment is the point that needs
to be addressed. However, to adopt a first moment as the criterion for a beginning is
to admit defeat, as far as arguing from the singularity to theism is concerned, because
the two plausible moves relative to contemporary cosmology (viz. taking space-time to
contain only points ‘after’ the singularity or invoking some perhaps presently unknown
theory that resolves the singularity) both lack a first moment. Given the demonstrable
contingency of the existence and uniqueness of a metric, it is unclear why finite metrical
age is so important even for GTR. As it turns out, the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215
made it a doctrine of faith for Roman Catholics that the world had a temporal beginning,
and even escapes the conventionalist worry by positing a first moment [McMullin, 1981a,
pp. 29, 54, 55]. The council’s definition is topological rather than metrical in character,
and so withstands the mathematical advances of the last 800-odd years. Important for
present purposes is the fact that this conciliar conclusion is an ostensible deliverance of
faith rather than reason.
As McMullin and Aquinas observe, creation in time does have some theological advan-
tages over eternal creation, even apart from adherence to the relevant part of the Genesis
account. It would be especially convenient for theists if modern cosmology had provided
strong support for creation in time, for both purely theological reasons and for providing
an argument for theism along the Kala¯m lines. On the other hand, the epistemology of
creation, at least for the author of the letter to the Hebrews in the New Testament, might
favor Aquinas rather than Bonaventure. The key passage is Hebrews 11:3: “By faith we
understand that the worlds were prepared by the word of God, so that what is seen was
not made out of things which are visible.” (NASB) Perhaps Christians should expect that
philosophical or scientific demonstrations for creation in time will fail. Whether such an
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expectation is licensed or not, I will argue that the Big Bang singularity fails to provide
good evidence for creation in time and hence theism.
3 Modern Cosmology and Creation
Modern physical cosmology is a rather effective framework for unifying and explaining
a wide variety of astronomical observations in a framework provided by well-confirmed
physical laws that hold here and now. Roughly speaking, one assumes a Robertson-
Walker spacetime metric satisfying Einstein’s gravitational field equations. This metric
is spatially homogeneous and isotropic, meaning that every point in space is alike at a
given moment of time, and every direction is also. Clearly this is an idealization. Data
from the present, especially the fact that luminous objects’ redshifts are larger for more
distant objects, indicate that the universe is expanding (modulo conventional redescrip-
tion, which might allow depiction of all objects as shrinking). The dynamics of general
relativity, with standard kinds of matter, lets one extrapolate back to an earlier hot
dense phase, during which time plausibly the observed cosmic abundances of light ele-
ments were produced. One theoretical problem that frequently has been neglected is the
“averaging problem,” the need to average Einstein’s equations over cosmic distances in
order to find equations for the cosmic parameters [Ellis, 1984, Buchert and Carfora, 2002,
Coley and Pelavas, 2006]. The analogous procedure for electromagnetism in a medium
is well-known and comparatively simple due to the linearity of Maxwell’s equations. For
Einstein’s equations, the dynamics of the average bears a complicated relation to the
average of the dynamics, so to speak, due to nonlinearities. Experimentally, since the
late 1990s it has appeared that the cosmic expansion is accelerating. However, some
contend that paying attention to the averaging problem might help to resolve the ap-
parent phenomenon of accelerating expansion, for which “dark energy” has been posited
[Buchert, 2007] as an explanation or at least a name. It has also been argued that part
of the persuasiveness of the acceleration of the cosmic expansion is an artifact of con-
ventional choices of statistical variables [Cattoen and Visser, 2007]. Little turns on these
issues for my purposes, because using the most current version of Big Bang cosmology
does nothing to strengthen the Big Bang singularity argument for creation and time
and hence theism. The same could be said for inflation, which John Earman and Jesus
Mosterin have examined critically [Earman and Mosterin, 1999]. I will freely ignore these
more recent developments in favor of the old hot Big Bang cosmology.
Given the observed cosmic expansion, mathematical extrapolation still further into the
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past—a bold move that might have little warrant, depending on how far one extrapolates—
implies that the spacetime metric was singular roughly 14,000,000,000 years ago: there
was a state of infinite curvature and density, through which Einstein’s equations allow
no further retrodiction. Contrary to some earlier hopes still present in the 1960s, general
relativistic singularity theorems show the singular behavior to be generic, not an artifact
of the high symmetry assumed in homogeneous isotropic or spherically symmetric models
as it is in Newtonian gravity [Wald, 1984]. If homogeneity is assumed (as it usually is, at
least for the prototypical models such as Robertson-Walker), then the singularity occurs
everywhere throughout all space, so it has seemed natural to speak of an origin of space (or
space-time) at the singularity. However, homogeneity on scales beyond the horizon is an
assumption or convention [Bondi, 1947, Layzer, 1954, McCrea, 1955, Callan et al., 1965,
Klein, 1971, Feynman et al., 1995, Smoller and Temple, 2003], not an empirical fact. In-
deed even the global topology of space-time is subject to worries regarding conventionality
[Glymour, 1973, Malament, 1977]. Empirically we have no (direct) access to regions more
distant than some billions of light years (at least apart from quantum mechanics), due
to relativistic causality constraints. As a result, claims that homogeneity holds out to,
say, a trillion light-years, or 1030 light-years, are not observationally well grounded. (Of
course inflationary cosmology could complicate matters.) I emphasize the spatially local
rather than global nature of current cosmological knowledge and hence of the singular-
ity in anticipation of discussing the analogy between Big Bang cosmology and the time
reversal of stellar gravitational collapse.
Some authors present the Big Bang singularity as potent evidence for creation in time
and hence for creation ex nihilo and consequently for theism. Among the most visible pro-
ponents at present are philosopher-theologian Craig [Craig, 1979, Craig and Smith, 1993,
Copan and Craig, 2004] and astrophysicist-apologist Hugh Ross [Ross, 2001, Ross, 1991],
though noteworthy working physicists and astronomers have endorsed it, as well as Pope
Pius XII. While Ross’s works generally are not aimed at the academy, they receive en-
dorsements by reputable physicists, cite technical papers and have some semi-popular
influence. As Ross puts the issue,
[i]n Hawking’s words, time itself must have a beginning. [footnote omitted]
Proof of the beginning of time may rank as the most theologically signifi-
cant theorem of all time, assuming validity of the general theory of relativity.
[Ross, 2001, p. 102] Today it can be said that no theory of physics has ever
been tested in so many different contexts and so rigorously as general relativ-
ity. The fact that general relativity has withstood all these tests so remarkably
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well implies that no basis at all remains for doubting the conclusions of the
space-time theorem. [Ross, 2001, p. 107]
By contrast William Lane Craig argues more carefully and concludes more modestly.
Craig formulates the Kala¯m cosmological argument along these lines. Craig formulates
an argument along these lines:
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause of its existence. [Craig, 1979, p. 63]
This argument is valid. The first premise seems true, at least on some readings of “be-
ginning,” including the one for which I argued above, namely, a first moment. The truth
of the second premise, or rather, the source of warrant for the second premise, is the key
question. Many theists will affirm the second premise and regard the Kala¯m argument
as sound, but soundness is not the only relevant issue. What is the reason for affirming
the second premise? Clearly one will not persuade the non-theist to accept theism (or
strengthen the theist’s faith with scientific support), as the argument is intended to do,
if the warrant for the second premise comes wholly from ostensible divine revelation. If
one accepts, say, the Bible or the Koran as divinely inspired, then one has already ac-
cepted theism and much else besides. The Big Bang singularity is an impassible barrier,
blocking the extension of the past to an earlier and perhaps metrically infinite past. If
the true history of the real world is characterized by such a singularity, then the world is
metrically finite in age. But it is unclear whether metrical finitude of age does the work
that the Kala¯m argument needs.
4 Tolerance or Intolerance toward Singularities?
The question therefore arises whether to take the singularity seriously as a feature of
the real world, or to dismiss it as an artifact of incomplete physical understanding. As
one sees all the time in papers on quantum gravity, most people who work on quan-
tum gravity take for granted that the Big Bang singularity is an artifact of incomplete
physical understanding and expect or hope that uniting gravity with quantum mechan-
ics in some kind of quantum gravity will resolve the singularity into some well-defined
situation that admits extrapolation to still earlier times, ad infinitum. Jayant Narlikar
has persuasively deployed this point as a critique of the argument from the singular-
ity to theism [Narlikar, 1992]. John Earman, by contrast, defends a much less widely
10
held view about singularities, namely, that we should display “Tolerance for Spacetime
Singularities” [Earman, 1996] and try to learn from them.
Tolerating singularities and trying to learn from them, as Earman does, is an attitude
that commends itself only to GTR-exceptionalists, those who emphasize the differences
between GTR and the other forces over the similarities between them. If one thinks
that gravity as portrayed by GTR is importantly like other forces, then gravitational
singularities are not appreciably more interesting than the singular electric field of a
point charge, which simply needs to be resolved by a better theory, such as quantum
electrodynamics. Thus “complete gravitational collapse [in that case is u]nimportant or
at most peripheral” [Misner et al., 1973, 437]. But if gravity differs importantly from
the other forces, one might conclude that “complete gravitational collapse [is c]entral
to understanding the nature of matter and the universe” [Misner et al., 1973, p. 437].
Then, however, one has strong technical reasons to doubt that singularities exist as part
of space-time.2 Within the Robertson-Walker cosmological space-time for t > 0 (which
is to say, always), one can ‘explain’ (in the fashion of Laplace’s demon) each moment
in terms of an earlier one [Gru¨nbaum, 1989, Smith, 2000]. Thus there is no beginning
required and premise 2 might be false, as far as physics can tell. Those who strive to ‘take
the lessons of relativity seriously,’ as GTR-exceptionalists do, might also have reason to
doubt the evolutionary space-evolving-over-time picture in favor of some inherently four-
dimensional picture. If one rejects the demand for such evolutionary explanations as a
hangover from Newtonian physics, then again the space-time for t > 0 seems sufficiently
self-explanatory that the singularity gives no reason to infer a Creator.
In contrast to GTR-exceptionalism, one might take the view, more common among
particle physicists, that Einstein’s equations describe a self-interacting massless spin 2
field, much as Maxwell’s equations describe a spin 1 field and the Yang-Mills equa-
tions describe a set of self-interacting spin 1 fields [Fierz and Pauli, 1939, Rosen, 1940,
Papapetrou, 1948, Gupta, 1954, Kraichnan, 1955, Feynman et al., 1995, Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965,
Weinberg, 1965, Sexl, 1967, Deser, 1970, Weinberg, 1972, van Nieuwenhuizen, 1973, Veltman, 1981,
Fang and Fronsdal, 1979, Pitts and Schieve, 2001, Boulanger and Esole, 2002]. The dis-
tinctive features of GTR are then seen as incidental (though important) technical conse-
quences of gravity’s having spin 2 rather than spin 1. While probably all who tolerate
singularities are GTR-exceptionalists, many or most GTR-exceptionalists, such as those
who work on canonical quantum gravity and loop quantum gravity, do not tolerate sin-
2One might have other reasons for doubting that singularities exist as part of space-time if one emphasizes
the analogy between gravity and other forces [Pitts and Schieve, 2003].
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gularities.
It appears, then, that whether one is tolerant or intolerant toward singularities, it
turns out that there is no first moment, because every moment is preceded by earlier
moments. Thus, in the relevant sense for the Kala¯m argument, there is no beginning
implied by physics, and so premise 2 might be false. In order for the Big Bang singularity
to provide a good theistic argument, the singularity must be well enough behaved to be
a real and intelligible part of space-time, and badly enough behaved that it cannot have
a past. Satisfying both conditions seems difficult and unlikely to be achieved. Moreover,
there are various reasons, some quite good, for not tolerating singularities, which it will
be worthwhile to explore.
5 Leibniz against Incompetent Watchmaker?
One might think that Leibniz has provided the prototype for a good critique of the
singularity argument for theism. In the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence [Alexander, 1956,
pp. 11, 12], Leibniz famously argued against Isaac Newton and Samuel Clarke that God
would not create the physical universe in such a way that it would break down and require
repair from time to time. Leibniz took Newton’s views to have just such a consequence,
so if the world is analogous to a watch, then Newton’s God is an incompetent watchmaker
because Newton’s God was required to perform miracles to restore the solar system to
working order. Whereas one sometimes encounters biological dysteleology arguments,
this is a physical dysteleology argument. Whether Newton and Clarke deserved this
criticism need not concern us. Acceptance of the analogy between the physical world
and a watch does not a rejection of miracles, for Leibniz accepted miracles of grace,
while rejecting miracles posited to fix nature due to poor design [Alexander, 1956, p. 12].
If the physical world is like a watch, then it ought to be able to run forever without
breaking down. But the singularity theorems of GTR show that it cannot ‘run forever
without breaking down.’ (There is no obvious analogy to the repair of the watch.) Thus
the singularity theorems arguably show that GTR demonstrates its own inadequacy, one
might conclude. Because God would not build the world so incompetently, it follows that
GTR is not the correct theory for describing gravitational collapse; the true theory would
not yield singularities. But GTR is time-reversal invariant, and the Big Bang singularity
is simply the time reversal of a specific model of gravitational collapse of a star, which uses
a Robertson-Walker metric for the stellar interior [Misner et al., 1973, pp. 846-859]. Thus
the Big Bang singularity would be eliminated along with the singularities of gravitational
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collapse, or so the argument goes.
This sort of argument continues to be used today, often without the explicit theism,
by theoretical physicists. Thus Abhay Ashtekar, one of the dominant figures in contem-
porary work on quantum gravity, opened a recent review of the field with the following
motivation:
Big-Bang and other singularities: It is widely believed that the prediction of
a singularity, such as the big-bang of classical general relativity, is primarily
a signal that the theory has been pushed beyond the domain of its validity.
A key question to any quantum gravity theory, then, is: What replaces the
big-bang? . . . [Ashtekar, 2001]
One can find similar sentiments elsewhere very easily among workers in quantum gravity.
Leibniz might or might not have been entitled to his “God wouldn’t do it that way”
premise. He lived in a still Christian age and took himself to know many things by
divine revelation; many contemporary physicists cannot say the same. If one is doing
natural rather than revealed theology, the premise about what God would or wouldn’t
do seems difficult to justify. Thus Elliott Sober has recently warned against this sort of a
priori theological claim about what God would or ought to do [Sober, 2003, Sober, 2007].
Whereas Stephen Jay Gould seemed to think that he knew that God (if he had existed)
wouldn’t have made the panda’s thumb as it is, Sober denies that Gould knew any such
thing about the plans of the Deity. It seems especially difficult for atheists to claim
to know a priori what God would or would not have done. Theists inclined toward
Reformed epistemology can appeal to the causal influence of God in certain instances of
belief formation [Plantinga, 2000]; whether this claim is true or not, it does not involve
the theist in self-contradiction. Atheists, on the other hand, can appeal neither to the
causal influence of God (on pain of self-contradiction) nor to the causal influence of the
absence of God (because non-entities do not act). At best the atheist can argue that
some specific God, who is ostensibly revealed in some specific holy book, would not have
acted in a certain way if he had existed. Such a claim, however, must be justified in
terms of the holy book in question. Most holy books have little explicit to say about
space-time singularities or the panda’s thumb, however, so the justification might take
some doing. The situation for someone who neither affirms nor denies theism is perhaps
the most interesting case, but I do not attempt to address it.
The Leibnizian intuition that God would not create a world that breaks down after a
finite time has a certain appeal for physicists, but reflection suggests that it might be dif-
ficult for the argument to get traction with those not already disposed to accept it, except
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perhaps for theistic rationalists such as Leibniz. That this Leibnizian intuition appeals
to physicists may reflect the fact, discussed in theories of science by Thomas Kuhn, Imre
Lakatos and others [Laudan et al., 1986], that ordinary scientific progress depends upon
a certain faith that things are on the right track and that progress is possible; anomalies
that could serve as counterevidence are in fact typically not regarded as threatening the
paradigm or hard core of the research program, but rather as opportunities to display its
excellence, sooner or later, by triumphing over difficulties. The Leibnizian intuition might
well be truth-conducive, but it is difficult to argue for that conclusion. If someone simply
lacks this intuition, it is difficult to argue her into it. If a proponent of the singularity
argument lacks this intuition, then this criticism might end in a stalemate. This phe-
nomenon bears some resemblance to the sort of stalemate that can result in the scientific
realism-antirealism debate [Kukla, 1998]. However, the sort of intellectual pessimism or
strong empiricism that rejects the Leibnizian intuition, if accepted, might undermine the
explanatory drive that motivates accepting premise 1 of the Kala¯m argument.
6 Induction from Earlier Theories’ Breakdown?
The physics of a century ago provides some material for an inductive argument that quan-
tum mechanics will fix the problems in Einstein’s classical theory of gravity. The story of
blackbody radiation and the development of quantum theory is complicated [Kuhn, 1978],
much more so than the view given in modern physics textbooks, but the following selection
should suffice. Just under a century ago, there were good classical theoretical arguments
for the Rayleigh-Jeans law for blackbody radiation, according to which the energy density
for radiation at a given frequency increased with frequency. (The Rayleigh-Jeans law was
also demonstrably false empirically, but in some ways that is an irrelevant accident for
present purposes.) But such a radiation law has to be wrong, because integrating over
all frequencies (up to +∞) implies that a blackbody radiates infinite power. Ordinary
objects, especially black ones, approximate blackbodies, so they would radiate away their
energy immediately in a blinding flash, contrary to experience. This difficulty has come
to be known as the “ultraviolet catastrophe.” The answer of Planck and others to the
threatening inference of ultraviolet catastrophe, history shows, helped to lead to quantum
mechanics. New theoretical foundations were brought in that yielded an exponentially
decaying factor to counteract the Rayleigh-Jeans power law growth and thus give a con-
vergent integral up to infinite frequency. (The exponentially decaying factor preceded
widespread worries about the ultraviolet catastrophe, but previously it was motivated on
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more empirical grounds.) From a logical point of view, the ultraviolet catastrophe was
a reductio ad absurdum of the classical physics underlying the Rayleigh-Jeans radiation
law. The solution was new physics of a quantum kind, which averted the catastrophic in-
finity. In theological terms, the moment-by-moment absence of such a disaster falls under
the category of general providence. A flaw in our understanding of general providence
was resolved not by special providence (miracle), but by an improved understanding of
general providence. Using this case and others, one might argue inductively that just as
quantum mechanics resolved these problems, so it will resolve the singularity problems
of GTR.
Earman insightfully discusses a similar argument to the effect that GTR contains
the seeds of its own destruction [Earman, 1996], citing Kip Thorne’s invocation of the
Rutherford atom. However, as Earman notes, the Rutherford atom with classical elec-
tromagnetism was empirically inadequate, something that cannot be said at present for
GTR’s prediction of gravitational collapse. A theory that predicts disaster here and now
clearly needs to be changed, if disaster is not observed. However, GTR fits the data rather
well. What of its ultimate mathematical breakdown? Earman observes that if GTR is
taken at face value, then there just is not some region ‘beyond’ the singularity that
the theory fails to describe. It would seem that the supposed inductive argument relies
on a metatheoretic criterion besides empirical adequacy to determine that GTR breaks
down, one that strongly resembles the Leibnizian intuition previously discussed. Thus
“[t]he analogy with the Rutherford atom is not apt.” [Earman, 1996] So this inductive
argument will not persuade those who are not persuaded by the Leibnizian intuition.
7 Stellar Collapse Implies Theistic Destroyer
One might wonder why theological significance should be ascribed to the Big Bang singu-
larity, but not to other physical singularities. This worry takes its most acute form when
one considers the similarity of the Big Bang cosmology to the time reverse of the gravita-
tional collapse of a star to a black hole with a central singularity. Assuming homogeneous
matter distributions, both Big Bang cosmology and stellar gravitational collapse use the
Robertson-Walker space-time metric in the matter-filled region [Misner et al., 1973, pp.
846-859]. If one chooses a Big Bang model with a bounded matter distribution, as one
certainly may [Bondi, 1947, Layzer, 1954, McCrea, 1955, Callan et al., 1965, Klein, 1971,
Feynman et al., 1995, Smoller and Temple, 2003], then both the Big Bang and gravita-
tional collapse have a Robertson-Walker interior matched to a Schwarzschild exterior.
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The main differences are the direction of time and the distance scale. The distance scale
does not seem important for present purposes. If the Big Bang strongly indicates that
there exists a God who created the universe, do formally similar time-reversed events
such as the gravitational collapse of stars to form black holes with singularities imply
that there exists a God who supernaturally destroys (annihilates, ceases to uphold) the
interiors of stars? This is a rather surprising conclusion. While Christianity portrays
God as creating, sustaining and redeeming the world, the idea of God’s absolutely anni-
hilating either the physical world as a whole or a bit here and there from time to time,
appears to be a novelty or certainly a rarity in Christian theology. Of course rocks, build-
ings and animals perish from time to time, but their physical remains persist, which is
precisely what does not happen here. Orthodoxy has held that even those who ‘perish’
in hell persist forever, body and soul, albeit in a miserable condition. Given the divine
policy of upholding the universe after creating it, for God to stop upholding, say, a star
that collapses to a black hole, would be a miracle. Thus, whatever asymmetry of time
might exist in relation to causation, does not help to avoid the conclusion that stellar
gravitational collapse terminates in a miracle. The proponent of the Big Bang argument
therefore needs to explain why the termination of stellar gravitational collapse is not a
miracle, or why such a miracle is not absurd. It is somewhat comforting that God, on
the view in question, would only annihilate regions of high density, perhaps typically
surrounded by an event horizon. Thus there is plenty of warning so that we may avoid
these episodes of annihilation, and the farmer who stores wheat in a silo need not fear the
annihilation of his wheat. Such a divine policy suffices for practical purposes. However,
positing miracles without any discernible divine purpose appears to have been rejected
by all serious people at all times, however friendly some of them were to miracles which
had some specifiable divine purpose—controversies of much weight in the 16th and 17th
centuries. It appears that one who argues from the Big Bang singularity is committed
to a novel and unreasonable view that God sometimes supernaturally destroys collapsed
stars. If GTR were the only possible theory to describe the divine governance of the
world in matters gravitational, perhaps one could manage to accept that conclusion. But
given the underdetermination of theories by data, the inference that God supernaturally
destroys stars appears to be a reductio ad absurdum of the Big Bang singularity argument
for theism.
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8 Stacking the Deck for General Relativity
There is a misleadingly persuasive move made by proponents of the Big Bang argument,
stacking the deck in favor of general relativity and thus of Big Bang cosmology against
nonsingular rivals. The move is generally not made explicitly and in detail, so what fol-
lows is a reconstruction of the reasoning process that would underlie any good argument
in the vicinity. It is often suggested that potentially nonsingular rivals to general relativ-
ity are speculative, whereas general relativity is well confirmed, so general relativity and
its retrodiction of the Big Bang singularity ought to be accepted as the default view that
challengers need to overcome with better empirical results. There is a grain of truth in
this claim: some or perhaps many of the theories or models actually proposed as rivals to
the Big Bang in the more speculative literature do not form part of a well-tested theory
that is known to reproduce the empirical successes of general relativity. Thus some of
these challengers might be refuted by data already in hand, should someone think to do
the necessary calculations and apply the relevant empirical data to the challengers. Were
the physics community’s (or its members’) physical knowledge closed under entailment,
such would-be challengers would be refuted even before publication; alas, human finitude
intrudes. However, the grain of truth in this objection sometimes conceals the grain of
falsehood that it also contains. Though not entirely trivial, it is possible to construct
theories that reproduce the empirical successes of general relativity in all tested regimes
to date, but which differ in the ultra-strong field regime relevant to Big Bang cosmology.
Granting the success of weak- and medium-field tests of general relativity involving light
bending, gravitational redshifting, time delay, and the like, why think that general rela-
tivity, rather than one of its (perhaps as-yet unproposed) competitors that fits the data
currently in hand, is the right extrapolation?
9 Quantum Gravity Tends to Resolve Singularities
The need to reconcile gravity and quantum mechanics all but proves that there exists a
consistent theory of gravity that matches general relativity in some classical limit, but
which differs from it in regimes when dimensional arguments suggest that quantum effects
should be large. There might well be many such theories of quantum gravity. The works of
Ashtekar and collaborators, such as [Ashtekar et al., 2006b, Ashtekar et al., 2006a], and
Bojowald and collaborators, such as [Bojowald, 2001a, Bojowald, 2001b, Bojowald, 2002,
Bojowald and Hinterleitner, 2002, Bojowald and Kagan, 2006], provide good evidence that
the Big Bang singularity does not occur in loop quantum gravity (but see ([Cartin and Khanna, 2005]).
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Loop quantum gravity is a part of the modern nonperturbative canonical quantum gravity
project [Pullin, 2003], which began began in the 1980s when Abhay Ashtekar proposed
new variables that helped to resolve long-standing problems faced when using the older
metric variables.
Moreover, a quantum theory of gravity is likely to differ considerably from GTR
precisely in the ultra-strong field regime of the hot dense ‘early’ universe, where the Big
Bang arguer relies essentially on GTR! Thus Robert Wald writes in a standard graduate
textbook on GTR: “Of course, at the extreme conditions very near the big bang singularity
one expects that quantum effects will become important, and the predictions of classical
general relativity are expected to break down.” [Wald, 1984, p. 100] In such a context,
curvatures comparable to the inverse square of the Planck length arise, so neglected
quantum terms should be large and the classical theory becomes a bad approximation.
In addition to the modern canonical quantization program, one should also keep an eye
on string theory as tending to resolve singularities [Gasperini and Veneziano, 2003], not
to mention various classical proposals that alter the dynamics in the strong field regime.
Lawrence Sklar once asked “Do Unborn Hypotheses Have Rights?” [Sklar, 1985].
Clearly they do in the present context. As Bas van Fraassen has noted in the context of
criticizing inference to the best explanation, “[w]e can watch no contest of the theories we
have so painfully struggled to formulate, with those no one has proposed. So our selection
may well be the best of a bad lot.” [van Fraassen, 1989, p. 143] P. Kyle Stanford argues
that the problem of unconceived alternatives is an even more serious problem for scientific
realism than are more commonly discussed worries [Stanford, 2006, Stanford, 2001]. Once
the rights of unborn theories are respected, the default status allegedly held by general
relativity and hence of Big Bang cosmology as described by GTR near the singularity
disappears. In the ultra-strong field regime of the hot dense so-called ‘early universe’ (to
use a term that presupposes the Big Bang singularity), GTR is just another speculation
among many. Is one truly rationally compelled, or even rationally encouraged, to accept
an infinite extrapolation from a curve that fits the data in some finite region? Surely
not. Sophisticated defenders of scientific realism now admit that different parts of a
scientific theory are supported to different degrees by the theory’s empirical confirmation
[Psillos, 1999, chs. 5, 6]. In the context of GTR, one should recognize that the theory’s
success in weak- and medium-strength gravitational fields provides little support for the
theory’s accuracy in strong gravitational fields such as near the Big Bang. But there
is no reason to restrict the competitors of GTR to theories that someone on Earth has
already proposed. The relevant set of competitors for GTR includes the set of theories
18
that agree with GTR on all experiments to date, whether already entertained on Earth
or not. This set might be infinite, might well be large, likely contains several members,
and almost certainly has at least one member, a quantum theory of gravity. The set
most likely has at least one member that resolves the singularities of GTR. Thus in the
strong-field regime, it is not at all clear why one should take GTR seriously.
10 Vicious God-of-the-Gaps Character
Some of the argumentation above resembles typical worries about ‘God-of-the-gaps’ apolo-
getic arguments [Saunders, 2002]. According to such worries, there is a long history of
appeals to special divine action to explain certain phenomena, but later natural ex-
planations for such phenomena appeared, making the appeal to special divine action
unnecessary. Making an induction over this history, one is supposed to learn the les-
son not to appeal to special divine action in such cases, lest one make religion look
foolish yet again when the gaps close. It has been argued recently that worries about
God-of-the-gaps arguments are overstated philosophically [Ratzsch, 2001, Snoke, 2001,
Larmer, 2002]; Del Ratzsch notes, for example, that the argument form is valid. These
worries might also be overstated historically. Are they part of the same complex of
overstatement and distortion as the Huxley-Draper-White science-religion warfare thesis
[White, 1896, Lindberg and Numbers, 1986, Brooke, 1991] and its subtheses such as the
Copernicus-dethroned-Earth thesis [Danielson, 2001] and the medievals-believed-in-a-flat
Earth thesis [Russell, 1991]? To my knowledge, the definitive history of God-of-the-gaps
arguments and their critiques has yet to be written.
Regarding the argument from the Big Bang singularity to theism, physicist Chris
Isham notes “its obvious susceptibility to the ‘God of the gaps’ syndrome, in which God is
relegated to filling in the blanks of an otherwise complete scientific theory” [Isham, 1997,
p. 378]. Even if one concedes that some gaps arguments for theism might be good
arguments, it remains clear that the Big Bang singularity argument is a bad argument
from gaps to God. That is clear because there is no non-conventional relevant difference
between the Big Bang singularity and stellar gravitational collapse. The latter surely has
no theological significance. Instead it indicates an incomplete understanding of physics
and hence of God’s ordinary providence (given theism). Thus this case is clearly the
sort that should be addressed theologically in ordinary providence rather than special
(miraculous) providence. It is not implausible that some singularity-wielding theistic
apologists will be tempted to resist scientific progress in the form of a new quantum
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theory of gravity in order to maintain an apologetic strategy in which they have invested.
Thus theistic apologists ought to be wary of arguing from the singularity to creation and
then to theism. Here I have assumed an intolerant attitude toward singularities. If one
does tolerate singularities, then every moment of the Big Bang model (t > 0) is preceded
by earlier moments and again there is no call for extramundane explanation.
11 Fluctuating and Inaccessible Warrant
A related problem with arguing from the Big Bang to creation in time is that such ar-
guments depend crucially on various highly technical premises which most people cannot
even entertain, much less evaluate. It follows that the vast majority of people, even ed-
ucated ones, simply are not entitled to beliefs on the matter, apart from relying on the
testimony of experts. But most people, even most educated people, cannot even reli-
ably identify relevant experts. Most astronomers and physicists are not relevant experts,
though they might well write popular books and make statements to the media on such is-
sues. Supposing that one manages to identify relevant experts, the problem remains that
their expert opinions will or should vary rather rapidly with the winds and waves of re-
search fortune. But should theology be affected much by the validity of Weak or Averaged
Null Energy Condition assumed for singularity theorems? It is now known that quan-
tum field theory violates the local classical energy conditions such as the Weak Energy
Condition, though apparently quantum field theory still satisfies certain averaged energy
conditions: energy density can be negative here and there, but not for very long and only
with greater compensation of positive energy nearby. Nonminimally coupled scalar fields
violate energy conditions [Ford, 2003, Ford and Roman, 2001, Barcelo and Visser, 2002],
as does massive gravity [Visser, 1998]. Are journalists, sociologists, homemakers and
truck drivers supposed to accept an argument whose premises are so technical that they
cannot understand them, and so unstable that they could prove false in the next issue
of Physical Review D? It is not clear why. Should the strength of one’s faith depend
on which factor ordering for the Hamiltonian constraint is correct in quantum gravity?
Martin Bojowald fairly recently wrote in a paper’s abstract [Bojowald, 2002]:
Because of genuinely quantum geometrical effects the classical singularity is
absent in those models in the sense that the evolution does not break down
there, contrary to the classical situation where space time is inextendible. This
effect is generic and does not depend on matter violating energy conditions,
but it does depend on the factor ordering of the Hamiltonian constraint.
20
Most people have no idea what that means and thus no idea what sort of plausibility to
assign a particular factor ordering of the Hamiltonian constraint. If some of them believed
in God because of the Big Bang singularity argument, must they now be able to refute
Bojowald’s choice of factor ordering in order to maintain that belief rationally? Even if
the singularity argument could not be decisively refuted, could it establish theism to a
significant degree for anyone besides the few dozens of people expert in factor ordering in
quantum gravity? It is unclear how. Could even the experts’ judgments rationally remain
stable enough to serve religious faith well? Probably not. But perhaps the choice of factor
ordering is not so important after all [Date and Hossain, 2005]; the fluctuations based on
detailed technical premises continue.3 If the singularity argument for theism does provide
any warrant for theism, that warrant fluctuates wildly for experts and cannot be assessed
by the laity.
Perhaps neither the singularity argument nor any other argument is the basis for
religious faith. Craig holds to something like Reformed epistemology [Plantinga, 2000]
(private correspondence and [Cowan et al., 2000]), which posits the work of God the Holy
Spirit as a causally reliable process that produces and sustains religious faith. Thus the
religious believer does not need to read and understand every relevant paper in Physi-
cal Review D to maintain theistic belief rationally. Perhaps this is the correct way to
understand the warrant for theistic belief. But if the point of making the singularity
argument is to provide an argument that not merely in fact persuades some people of
theism, but rationally ought to persuade them, then Reformed epistemology is simply
irrelevant to the question at hand. The fluctuating (for the experts) and inaccessible (for
non-experts) character of such warrant (if any) as an argument from the singularity to
theism is another reason that theistic apologists ought to abandon this strategy.
12 Conclusion
Given the many difficulties involved in arguing from Big Bang cosmology to creation in
time, it is encouraging that Pope John Paul II has suggested caution:
3The point having been made, perhaps a brief explanation of the factor ordering problem is appropriate
[Komar, 1979]. In classical physics, the Hamiltonian description involves various products of coordinates q
and momenta p. In some theories, every term is just a power of q or of p, but not both. But what if there is
a term involving powers of both q and p, as is true in Einstein’s theory of gravity? Then the order in which
they are written, such as p2q2 or q2p2 or qppq for example, though of no importance classically, is of some
importance in quantum theory.
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. . . some theologians, at least, should be sufficiently well-versed in the sciences
to make authentic and creative use of the resources that the best-established
theories may offer them. Such an expertise would prevent them from making
uncritical and overhasty use for apologetic purposes of such recent theories as
that of the “Big Bang” in cosmology. [John Paul II, 1997, pp. M11, M12]
This papal call for caution in apologetic use of Big Bang cosmology compares favorably
with the rather less cautious remarks of Pope Pius XII in 1951 that caused concern for
Lemaˆıtre and McMullin [McMullin, 1981a, Kragh, 2004].
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